Abstract
Introduction
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential freedoms . . . The first is freedom of speech and expression . . . The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way . . . The third is freedom from want . . . The fourth is freedom from fear. That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. 1 Roosevelt's bold vision, mapped out in his famous State of the Union Address in January 1941 and reiterated a few months later jointly with Churchill in the Atlantic Charter, 2 marked the beginning of a Copernican turn in international law. It was the start of the 'human rights revolution' in international law which would eventually deprive 'the sovereign states of the lordly privilege of being the sole possessors of rights under international law'. 3 Seventy years later, we have come a long way towards realizing Roosevelt's and Churchill's dream for a better world. Their hope, however, that an international order founded on human rights would be firmly established in their 'time and generation' would prove to be too optimistic. Despite the revolutionary pathos of the United Nations Charter which 'reaffirm[s] faith in fundamental human rights', the new world order established in 1945 gave the sovereignty of states rather than human rights pride of place amongst the constitutional principles spelt out in Article 2. Indeed, human rights do not figure at all among the 'principles' of the Charter but are relegated to the solemn 'purposes' and aspirations laid down in the preamble and Article 1. To the great disappointment of many human rights activists at the time, the attempt made at the San Francisco Conference to include an international bill of rights in the Charter failed. 4 Following the relatively swift success in formulating a 'common understanding' of human rights in the Universal Declaration in December 1948, 5 it was to take almost another 20 years to finalize the project of creating a binding 'International Bill of Rights' with the adoption of the two Covenants in 1966. 6 However, Roosevelt's and Churchill's great vision of a world in which human rights constitute the true foundation of the entire edifice of international law has still not been completely realized. Bruno Simma's General Course on 'The Impact of Human Rights on International Law', held in 2009 at the Hague Academy of International Law, bears witness both to the success achieved and the work still left to be done in the effort to impress the mark of human rights indelibly on the international legal system. The imprint which human rights have left to date on the 'ancien régime' of international law 8 is in no small degree attributable to Bruno Simma's unfailing commitment to taking human rights seriously, both as a scholar and in his manifold functions as a practitioner. His unwavering ceterum censeo in the service of international human rights has led some to describe him in exasperation as a 'droit-de-l'hommiste', 9 a characterization which Bruno Simma himself and many others would rather perceive as a badge of honour. 10 It seems a fitting coincidence that Bruno Simma's 70th birthday and the 70th anniversary of Roosevelt's and Churchill's momentous call for a new 'moral' world order coincide. It has largely been forgotten that two Munich alumni, Ernst Rabel (1874 Rabel ( -1955 and Karl Loewenstein (1891 -1973 , belonged to the first generation of 'droit-del'hommistes' who, in the early 1940s, inspired by the Four Freedoms Speech and the Atlantic Charter, laid the foundations for the entrenchment of human rights in the international legal order.
In honouring Bruno Simma, who taught international law at the University of Munich for 30 years, the present contribution will try to retrace the odyssey which took his fellow alumni from Munich to Philadelphia, where in 1942 they were invited to join a committee of international experts responsible for drafting an international bill of rights for a post-war peace settlement.
Rabel, Loewenstein and the Internationalization of Legal Scholarship in Germany
When Ernst Rabel 11 joined the Munich faculty in 1916 German legal scholarship found itself behind 'thick walls of self-sufficiency' 12 in 'a state of ethnocentric isolation'. 13 Legal thought in Germany had become lost in 'arid positivism' which shut its eyes to the legal world beyond its national borders.
14
The reasons for this splendid isolation lay mainly in the particular political situation of the German Empire at the time. 15 The German nation had achieved its political uni- fication only in 1871. Legal science had since been preoccupied with the task of creating a unified law for the young German Empire, first by assisting in the process of drafting the Civil Code and the other great codifications of the late 19th century, and later by interpreting the new codes so as to make them applicable in practice.
16
German jurisprudence was consumed with the idea of creating a logically consistent system of law on the basis of the new codifications which would provide answers to each and every problem of life. 17 Legal thought was hence essentially conceptual and dogmatic, working exclusively within the confines of positive German law.
18 Historical, sociological, and philosophical conditioning factors as such were not considered relevant to legal science. The steady political, military, and economic rise of the German Empire seemed to render moot the question of the legitimacy and efficiency of German law. 19 In this spirit of uncritical positivism and nationalism it was not thought necessary or even useful to carry the legal analysis beyond national borders. This attitude applied both to the comparative study of foreign legal systems 20 and to international law. 21 At the beginning of the 20th century professorial chairs dedicated specifically to international law did not exist at German universities. 22 International law was marginalized and many denied its autonomous existence, relegating it in the Hegelian tradition to external domestic public law (äußeres Staatsrecht) 23 or to an apology for belligerent power politics. 24 It was in this intellectual climate -two years into World War I -that Ernst Rabel founded the Institute of Comparative Law at the University of Munich. 25 Despite the economic blockade and the heightened nationalism during the war Rabel succeeded in persuading the Bavarian government and private sponsors to fund his visionary project. 26 His ambition was no less than the liberation of German legal thought from its self-imposed isolation and the preparation of German legal scholarship for a globalized economy:
We must again work in the world and with the world. What would become of our chemical or medical sciences if they isolated themselves from the outside world? We must in the same way re-establish the reputation of German legal scholarship, regain international acclaim for 16 Koskenniemi, supra note 15, at 209; Rheinstein, supra note 14, at 236. 17 Rheinstein, supra note 14, at 233. 18 Ibid., at 233. 19 Ibid., at 237-238. 20 Ibid., at 232-238. 31 Rabel not only turned the University of Munich into a focal point for comparative law in Germany but also carried a spirit of 'world-mindedness' 32 into the faculty, precipitating a systematic internationalization of its curriculum. The wide variety of courses in comparative, private, and public international law offered by the University of Munich between 1916 and 1933 was without parallel and remarkable even by today's standards. 33 Defeat in World War I and the revolution in 1919 changed the attitude of German scholarship to foreign and international law. 34 With the collapse of the old institutions the naïve positivism of the pre-war years had lost its legitimacy. Legal science could no longer simply treat the law as a given national fact, but was called upon to build and redefine the legal institutions in the spirit of the new republic. 35 The attention of German legal thought turned to the sociological functions and the philosophical foundations of the law. 36 Law was increasingly understood as a universal phenomenon, the proper appreciation of which required the extension of legal analysis beyond the national legal system. 37 In addition, the reconstruction of international trade relations dramatically increased the need for competent advice on foreign law. Rabel, supra note 25, at 282; Rheinstein, supra note 14, 241. The Seminar of International Law in Kiel, which was founded by Theodor Niemeyer in 1914 and which in 1918 was elevated to the status of an institute, was mainly devoted to public international law: see Koskenniemi, supra note 15, at 232. 29 Rheinstein, supra note 11, at 194: '[a]lready before the National-Socialist revolution the majority of German law faculties had begun to follow the example which Rabel had established in Munich, and to create special institutes of comparative law'.
30
Coester-Waltjen, supra note 11, at 80; Rheinstein, supra note 11, at 194. 31 Kunze, supra note 25, at 33. 32 Rheinstein, supra note 11, at 190, 193. 33 See the course catalogues of the University of Munich for the relevant period, available at: http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/view/subjects/vlverz_04.html (accessed 30 Aug. 2011).
34
See Koskenniemi, supra note 15, at 209-236; Rheinstein, supra note 14, at 238-243; Stolleis, supra note 21, at 60-64. 35 Rheinstein, supra note 14, at 238-239. 36 Ibid., at 250-252. 37 Ibid., at 239. Finally, the Peace Treaties which imposed heavy burdens on the new Republic led to a growing interest in international law. 39 A profound knowledge of international law was considered to provide the only chance of mitigating the consequences of what most Germans at the time considered to be an unfair Diktat. 40 The inclusion of international law in the curriculum of German universities was suddenly recognized as being in the national interest.
Due to Rabel's visionary foresight the Munich Institute of Comparative Law was fully braced to confront the new challenges brought to the legal profession by the end of the War. It therefore came as no great surprise that the Government of the Reich also increasingly relied on Rabel's expertise. In 1921 he was chosen to be an arbitrator at the German-Italian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal which adjudicated on reparation claims against the German Reich, and in 1925 he was appointed judge ad hoc at the Permanent Court of International Justice in the disputes between the German Reich and Poland concerning the expropriation of German assets in Upper Silesia.
41
With Rabel's rising fame it became inevitable that the University of Munich would finally have to let its great comparatist move on. After almost 10 years at the University of Munich he accepted an offer from the Friedrich-Wilhelms-University (today's Humboldt University) in Berlin. The main incentive and the conditio sine qua non for Rabel's move to Berlin was a generous endowment furnished by the Reich and German industry which enabled him to develop his pioneering work on a much larger scale. 42 He became the founding director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, which was established in the Berliner Stadtschloss alongside its counterpart for foreign and international public law. 43 When Rabel moved from Munich to Berlin in 1926, Loewenstein, who was 30 years of age at the time, had not even started work on his Habilitation thesis. Although he had always aspired to an academic career he did not possess the financial means necessary to bridge the anticipated long waiting period between qualifying as a Privatdozent (non-stipendiary assistant professor) and being awarded a full professorship. 44 In order to create a sufficient economic basis for his academic ambitions he became a solicitor. 45 Despite running a busy law firm he eventually managed to finalize his Habilitation thesis on the 'Manifestations of Constitutional Amendments' in 1931. 46 was, as its subtitle suggests, a 'dogmatic' study in the traditional German style, and as such not typical of his academic oeuvre. Loewenstein reveals in his memoirs that he chose this conservative approach 'purely for utilitarian reasons' in order to pre-empt any objections from the old school positivist members of the Munich faculty. 47 In contrast, his earlier writings, which all centred round constitutional law issues, 48 reflected rather the new 'antipositivist' methodological approaches which shook up the academic establishment after World War I and culminated in the famous Methodenstreit of the mid-1920s. 49 Loewenstein was both a 'realist' and a comparatist. As a 'realist' he was strongly influenced by the legal sociology of Max Weber whom he knew personally and whom he considered one of his most important academic inspirations. 50 It was particularly the experience of the normative frailty of the Weimar constitution which focused his interest throughout his academic career on the interaction between constitutional law and constitutional reality (Verfassungswirklichkeit). 51 As a comparatist he considered it his academic vocation 'to trawl foreign constitutional practice in order to draw lessons for German constitutional life from the experience made abroad'. 52 In the 1920s and early 1930s he followed the developments in British constitutional law and practice with particular zeal.
53
When Loewenstein joined the faculty as a Privatdozent in 1931 he was awarded the venia legendi for 'the general theory of the State, German and foreign constitutional law, and public international law'.
54 Thus Loewenstein added a public law dimension to the international profile of the legal faculty which until that time had been dominated by private law. 55 In this sense he stood at the beginning of a line of tradition at Munich University which can be followed all the way to Hitler's rise to power, however, put an abrupt end to the promising start of the Jewish Privatdozent's academic career. As Loewenstein describes in his memoirs, his international law students in Munich initially remained loyal:
When I came to the lecture hall on January 30, 1933, the day of Hitler's seizure of power, only a small fraction of the students expressed their discontent . . .; they were, however, soon silenced by the constant stamping of the feet of the great majority. The student body at the time had not yet been forced into line or terrorised. 58 Nevertheless, he was soon to receive a letter from the Bavarian government which read, '[t]he admission as Privatdozent is hereby revoked since constitutional theory and law cannot be taught by a Non-Aryan in the National Socialist State'. 59 Loewenstein's dream of an academic career in Germany had been shattered. His immediate realization that, owing to his Jewish descent, there was no future for him as an academic scholar nor as a practising lawyer in the German Reich spared him a worse fate. Due to his excellent command of English and his good contacts in the United States he succeeded within a reasonably short time in obtaining a position as associate professor of political science at Yale University. leave behind everything he had so successfully built up. Despite all the humiliations the Nazi regime inflicted upon him he stubbornly persisted in attempting to continue his academic work in Germany. In 1937 he was forced to resign from his position as director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute. 63 Eventually he was even denied access to his Institute library. 64 Only at the insistence of his closest friends could Rabel finally bring himself in 1939 to emigrate to the United States. 65 Rabel's world had fallen apart. For the once celebrated professor and internationally recognized representative of the German Reich in numerous international bodies, it proved to be extremely difficult to find a new academic home in the United States. 66 In this sense Rabel's fate was much more typical of that of Jewish emigrants than Loewenstein's. 67 It was only through the initiative of his friend William Draper Lewis, the director of the American Law Institute, that a task worthy of Rabel's intellectual calibre could be found. The American Law Institute (ALI) invited him to write 'European Annotations' to the Restatement of the American Conflict of Laws. 68 The project was later taken over by the University of Michigan Law School where he was granted the status of a 'research associate'. 69 Rabel's spirit and inquiring mind remained unbroken. In Ann Arbor he wrote his magnum opus, a four-volume comparative study of the conflict of laws. If it were possible to prove that among the great legal cultures of the world a consensus existed about certain 'essential' human rights there should be no serious obstacle to the inclusion of such rights in a peace treaty. 73 which seems at first sight somewhat surprising, Germany 89 and Italy. 90 In view of the barbarism of National Socialism and Fascism, was it really possible for Germany and Italy to be counted among the 'civilised nations' whose legal cultures inform the general principles of international law?
Paradoxically it was precisely the inhumanity of the Hitler and Mussolini regimes which secured German and Italian legal thought a seat at the table of the 'major cultures of the world'. 91 The numerous German and Italian legal scholars who, like Rabel and Loewenstein, were forced into emigration had revealed the decent face of German and Italian legal culture to the world.
92 National Socialism and Fascism were viewed by the American Law Institute as a cancerous growth that had laid itself upon the otherwise vital body of German and Italian legal thought. 93 For Lewis it was beyond doubt that 'pre-Nazi Germany' 94 and pre-Fascism Italy belonged to the great legal cultures of the world.
It so happened that Ernst Rabel and Karl Loewenstein, together with the German émigré lawyer Georg Wunderlich, 95 were invited to join the international experts' committee. Rabel and Loewenstein were not only very worthy ambassadors of 'preNazi' German legal culture 96 but, as highly skilled comparatists, were ideally suited to the envisaged task of distilling general principles of human rights from the world's national constitutions. It was therefore hardly surprising that they were both to play a key role in the process of drafting the Statement of Essential Human Rights. In comparing national constitutional law only elements of legal culture 'consciously or unconsciously affected by Nazi or Fascist philosophy or the philosophy of the Japanese military' were to be excluded: see Lewis, supra note 76, at 185. 94 Thus the designation in the Statement of Essential Human Rights, supra note 71, at 18 n 1.
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Wunderlich did not play a significant role in the experts' committee. His main contribution was the preparation of a report on the Weimar Constitution which remained, however, largely superficial and descriptive: see Wunderlich, 'Preparing an International Bill of Rights: The German Conception' (Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School, American Law Institute Archives, Series VI, Subseries 3, Box 6052, Folder 22, 48 pp, without date).
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Despite his Austrian descent, Rabel was considered by the American Law Institute to be a representative of 'pre-Nazi German' legal culture: see Statement of Essential Human Rights, supra note 71, at 18 n 1.
judge at the International Court of Justice; Ludwik Rajchman, initiator and first director of UNICEF; and Wilfred Jenks, later general director of the International Labour Organization.
97
The proceedings of the Committee make fascinating reading. 98 It is striking to realize how many aspects of human rights law later to be hailed as new dogmatic discoveries were in fact conceived in the early 1940s by the advisors of the American Law Institute. In the context of this short sketch it is only possible to highlight a few of the many treasures buried in the archives of the American Law Institute upon which Rabel's and Loewenstein's contribution had a particular bearing.
B Social Rights and Protective Duties
The most intensely debated issue among the committee members was the question whether a universal bill of rights could indeed encompass all Four Freedoms which Roosevelt and Churchill envisaged as the foundation of a future world order.
99
In addition to the classical liberal First Amendment freedoms of speech and religion the Atlantic Charter promised 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'.
100 Contemporary observers and the majority of the ALI committee took the Four Freedoms as a call for an integrated human rights concept encompassing 'positive' liberties. 'Freedom from fear' was understood as an individual right to protection against encroachments on individual liberties from within the societal sphere, 101 'freedom from want' as a guarantee of those basic social and economic conditions which are indispensable for a life in dignity. 102 Loewenstein was staunchly in favour of including social rights in the Statement of Essential Human Rights. He even went so far as to posit that 'Positive Rights of Social Justice and Economic Security' should become 'the core and the essential part of an International Bill of Rights'. 103 In a passionate appeal he urged his fellow committee members to look beyond the 'liberal-bourgeois' spirit of the American Bill of Rights and the other classical human rights documents of the late 19th century:
The danger inherent in any attempt at drafting an International Bill of Rights lies in the temptation to establish a system of such rights which is more or less a restatement of previously existing catalogues of the liberal-bourgeois period of history extending roughly from the French Revolution to the Russian revolution in 1917. − that religion should be freely exercised -whereas Catholic and Evangelical churches are persecuted and Jewish synagogues set on fire; − that the people be secure in their persons, houses, papers -whereas no person is safe from concentration camp, or torture, no house assured against nightly searches and violence; − that no person shall be held for a crime without proper indictment -whereas thousands upon thousands are incarcerated, maimed and killed by licentious police; − that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, an orderly defense and an impartial court, that confiscations are illicit -these just distant dreams of innumerable victims.
In Germany, in Italy, in Japan, and in all the countries which have fallen under their yoke, the American Bill will come a second time as a promise of liberation, and this time its immense import will be better understood. 105 Rabel was not categorically opposed to the inclusion of social rights. He realized that such rights had already been entrenched in a considerable number of national constitutions, including the Weimar constitution. 106 His concern was that, in contrast to Loewenstein's proposal, liberal rights should continue to be given 'a privileged place' in the future International Bill of Rights.
107
In the end the committee of experts discarded both Loewenstein's and Rabel's advice in favour of the integral approach advocated by Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, according to which liberal and social rights, negative and positive liberties are, as it was later put, 'indivisible and interdependent and interrelated'.
The final draft of the Statement of Essential Human Rights contained a comprehensive catalogue of social rights, including such rights as the right to education, to work, to reasonable conditions of work, to adequate food and housing, as well as social security. Loewenstein initially maintained, in keeping with the view prevailing amongst constitutional scholars in the Weimar Republic, that social rights belonged more 'to the domain of programmatic intentions than to that of positive law' and were 'probably unenforceable'. 109 In his opinion they were nevertheless of essential importance as a matter of 'international psychology' since social rights affected 'the common man' most directly: '[p]olitical psychology demands . . . that we boldly enter this uncharted sea of a new social world'. 110 The final draft of the ALI Statement and its commentary, in contrast, painstakingly elaborate the normative contents of the social rights. 111 The ALI committee of experts thereby foreshadowed some of the ground-breaking work undertaken by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights during Bruno Simma's tenure as one of its members. 112 The ALI experts also challenged the conventional wisdom that liberal freedoms exclusively impose negative obligations on the state. In a truly revolutionary move the committee maintained that classical liberal human rights also impose a positive 'duty to protect' the respective freedoms. 113 This was understood as a duty of the state not only to offer protection against encroachments on human rights by private actors, but in a comprehensive sense to ensure by governmental action the 'practical effect' of human rights. 114 Also in this respect the ALI draft anticipated what belongs today to the acquis of international human rights law.
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C Ernst Rabel's Battle for the Right to Property
William Draper Lewis appointed Ernst Rabel, whom he already knew through their cooperation in the project of drafting 'European annotations' to the Conflict of Law Restatement, 116 as rapporteur of the subcommittee on property rights. 117 He thereby entrusted Rabel with an extremely delicate mission. Amongst the experts there was a strong current of opinion which opposed the inclusion of a right to property in the The Constitutional Court relied heavily on the fact that the right to property was not included in the two International Human Rights Covenants. However, more than 40 years after the adoption of the Covenants and 20 years after the end of the Cold War the conclusion reached by the Court seems far from convincing. 126 Had Rabel had the opportunity to plead his case before the German Federal Constitutional Court the judges might well have been more amenable to recognizing the right to property as a universal human right.
D Karl Loewenstein: The Father of the Right to Democracy
Karl Loewenstein was possibly the most innovative mind in the ALI experts' committee. As special rapporteur for political rights 127 he advocated the inclusion of a completely novel provision in the International Bill of Rights which addressed the mutual relationship between democracy and human rights.
Thus far national constitutions had strictly separated the Bill of Rights from the frame of government. Loewenstein, however, put forward the proposition that human rights were not neutral in relation to the frame of government. 128 History had shown, and this was also his personal experience, that human rights can be realized only in a democracy. 129 Since a democratic constitution was accordingly an indispensible condition for the effective realization of human rights, an international bill of rights without this structural conditio sine qua non would make no sense. 130 This insight led Loewenstein to formulate a truly revolutionary right to democracy ('a revolution within a revolution'), 131 which was adopted as Article 16 of the ALI draft: '[e]very one has the right to take part in the government of his state'. This right to participation in government corresponds to a duty of the state 'to conform to the will of the people as manifested by democratic elections'. The 'Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' about which Thomas Franck speculated in 1992 132 had thus already been formulated 50 years earlier. 133 
